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The euro is now more than ten years old.  It has not quite lived up to the early expectations but 
has performed well since its introduction.  This paper seeks to review the currency’s history and 
evaluate its potential over the next ten years given a list of currency strength factors. This 
evaluation was based on a thorough review of available research regarding the topic.   This paper 
finds that, despite some significant weaknesses, both the currency and its underlying economy are 
relatively strong and poised to grow in the long-term.  As such, it makes the case for an 
appreciated currency in the next ten years. 
 





ince the euro’s debut in 1999, many have predicted that it will ultimately surpass the United States’ dollar 
as the world’s preeminent currency.  Although far from achieving that feat, the euro has been gaining 
momentum since its introduction.  Given this modest level of success, it seems pertinent to evaluate how 
the currency will fair over the next ten years. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the euro’s beginnings and evaluate the currency’s future prospects.  
This evaluation includes a review of some economic strength gauges, such as economic size and growth, inflation, 
current account balances, and fiscal policy.  These discussions will be followed up with a review of the currency’s 
demand profile as characterized by its international usage and foreign currency reserve weightings.  Each of these 
areas will also include comparisons against the United States’ economy and the dollar.  The findings from all these 
discussions will be used to project the euro’s direction in relation to other currencies over the next ten years. 
 
Before delving into the various aspects of a currency’s strength, it is important to first review the euro’s 




After devastating and demoralizing wars in the early twentieth century, European leaders decided that the 
best course for establishing long-lasting peace was to unify economically.   The Treaty of Rome (1957) was one of 
the first attempts at unification.  It formed the European Economic Community, which in 1969 commissioned a 
group, led by the Prime Minister of Luxembourg, to research and establish a blueprint for monetary and economic 
union.  The goal was to implement these policies by 1980.  However, severe global currency market disruptions in 
the 1970s derailed these plans.  In 1989, European leaders renewed their unification hopes with the development of 
the Delors proposal.  This plan introduced the idea of the European Central Bank.  The proposal was largely 
accepted and integrated into the euro’s conceptual framework as the Treaty of Europe (Dominguez, 2006).  The 
timetable established by the Delors proposal was faithfully followed and led to the January 1999 adoption by eleven 
European countries of the euro as their official currency.  Membership has since grown to seventeen countries with 
the June 2010 inclusion of Estonia. 
 
The European Central Bank’s policies are crucial to the euro’s future strength so it is imperative to explore 
the bank’s structure, role, and objectives before proceeding further.   
 
S 
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The European Central Bank (ECB) was officially established in June 1998 under several treaties signed by 
the original Euro area nations.  These nations empowered the ECB by transferring their monetary policy 
responsibilities in 1999.  The ECB is comprised of three decision making bodies:  the governing council, executive 
board, and the general council.  Membership for these positions is currently at thirty-three.  The governing and 
general councils are appointed by their home countries while the executive board members are appointed by 
consensus among the Euro area’s heads of state.   
 
The effectiveness of the European Central Bank is dependent upon its staff members remaining 
independent.  In fact, independence is emphasized throughout the ECB constitutional framework, which urges 
members to refrain from seeking advice or instructions from government officials.  Political influence can become 
disruptive and can serve only limited constituencies.  By remaining independent the ECB can focus on the best 
strategies to accomplish its objectives. 
 
According to the European Central Bank’s mission statement, it works in conjunction with other European 
Union national banks to focus primarily on maintaining policies that support pricing stability.  Accordingly, the 
ECB believes that maintaining stable prices is paramount to the development of economic welfare and growth 
opportunities.  Pricing stability is defined by the Governing Council as an annual increase in the “Harmonised Index 
of Consumer Prices” (HICP) of less than two percent.  To accomplish this goal, the ECB adjusts interest rates, issues 
bank notes, and establishes banking reserve requirements.     
 
By effectively maintaining pricing stability, the ECB will play a critical role in ensuring that the euro 




The introduction of the euro has been a momentous event in contemporary finance.  It has had a profound 
global impact that will last for generations.  Accordingly, a vast amount of research has been dedicated to the subject 
in recent years. 
 
Kathryn Dominguez (2006) provided some insight into the euro’s history and elaborated on the currency’s 
framework.  She also explored the European Central Bank’s basic monetary policies.  Kathryn further evaluated the 
currency’s global role and finished her discussion with concerns regarding the euro’s looming challenges.   
 
In 1995, Jeffrey Frankel wrote “Still the Lingua Franca”, an article in which he projected that the euro 
would not challenge the dollar for supremacy in the near future.  He questioned the popularized theory that the 
dollar was faltering.  Although he admitted that the U.S.’ GDP performance has not been ideal, he characterizes 
much of the dollar’s negative sentiment as short-sighted.  
 
Honohan, Lane, Ventura, and Begg researched recent reports of divergent inflation rates throughout the 
EMU (2003).  They studied data from 1972 through 2003 and hypothesized that divergence was directly related to 
exchange rate movements and were more noticeable in accession years.  Honohan, Lane, Ventura, and Begg also 
found that the ECB’s policies had a stabilizing effect on the region.  Finally, the authors concluded that the United 
States historically experienced a greater degree of divergence than the EMU.   
 
In 2003, Galí, Perotti, Lane, and Richter evaluated the effects of both fiscal and monetary policy in the 
Euro area.  They challenged recent critisms of the Maastricht Treaty and Growth and Stability Growth Pact.  The 
authors conducted empirical research and found no evidence to support the fiscal policy impairment claims.  
Furthermore, the authors discovered support indicating improved responses to economic vicissitudes.   
 
Olivier Blanchard evaluated the Euro area’s economy in 2004 and used these observations to project the 
region’s economic prospects.  Included in this discussion were GDP, productivity, labor markets, unemployment 
policies and a variety of other topics.  Overall, Olivier projected a more optimistic future for the region, based on 
improving productivity measures. 
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In 2005, Goldberg, Engel, and Portes studied the trade invoicing practices of current EMU members and 
assessed the trade potential for accession candidates.  The authors provided a list of determinants in selecting the 
optimal currency to use in international transactions.  They also reviewed countries that predominantly invoice in 
euros. 
 
Finally, Kaminskey, Lizondo, and Reinhart in 1998 documented some general economic factors that are 
indicative of currency weaknesses, which could be useful in evaluating the euro.  This International Monetary Fund 
workpaper was written in the wake of several Asian currency crises in hopes of preventing or predicting future 
catastrophes.   
 
The discussion above provides a brief summary of some of the more influential articles pertaining to the 
euro and its underlying economy.  The next section will re-introduce the currency strength factors, which will segue 
into a performance evaluation for each category. 
 
CURRENCY STRENGTH EVALUATION FACTORS 
 
To evaluate the euro’s currency strength ten years from now, it is important to first establish criteria for 
measuring this competency.  Currencies are dynamic and change in value for a variety of reasons.  Valuations are 
generally based on comparisons with other currencies and evaluated based on future prospects.  Many economists 
have indicated that the strength of a currency is greatly related to the underlying performance of the supporting 
economy.  Therefore, it is imperative to evaluate the economy to properly forecast the strength of a currency years 
into the future.  For the purposes of this discussion, several criteria have been selected to evaluate the euro area.  
They are economic size and growth, inflation levels, fiscal policy, as well as the national current account.  These 
criteria have been selected from the International Monetary Fund’s long list of influential currency variables 
(Kaminsky, Lizondo, & Reinhart, 1998).   
 
Another important aspect to consider when evaluating a currency’s strength is its demand profile.  It 
includes international usage and foreign currency reserve weightings.  These factors have an interrelated-causal 
relationship with the factors mentioned above.  While demand can be a strength measure, it can contribute to it as 
well.  
 
The following sections will explain each currency strength factor, followed by a discussion of the Euro 
area’s performance in each category.  Then, the euro’s performance will be compared with the U.S. dollar. 
 
ECONOMIC SIZE AND GROWTH 
 
Economic size and growth is one of the most important factors when contemplating a currency’s relative 
strength to its peers.  These attributes are best measured by national output, or Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  
GDP is one of the primary indicators for evaluating an economy’s health.  The larger the economy supporting the 
currency the more confidence the markets have in the currency’s liquidity.  Larger economies also offer sanctuary 
from external blows while providing larger capital markets for foreign investment (Bergsten, 1997). 
 
Historically, the Euro area’s annual GDP growth rates have underperformed the other major economies.  
Specifically, the Euro area’s output grew twenty-nine percent compared to the United States’ forty-five percent from 
1990 to 2004 (Blanchard, Giavazzi, & Sa, International Investors, the U.S. Current Account, and the Dollar, 2005).  
Hans-Jürgen Bieling, a political science professor at the Phillips-Universität Marburgin in Germany denounced the 
area’s economic growth over the past thirty years as “mediocre”.   He attributes the problems in the early 2000s to 
the European Central Bank’s exclusive focus on inflation and the Stability and Growth Pact’s governmental 
spending restraints (Bieling, 2006).  
 
Although growth in the Euro area has not been ideal, other developments point towards a more promising 
future.  Gross Domestic Product per hour worked has increased substantially since 1970.  The region has become 
more efficient as a result of monetary unionization.  Oliver Blanchard makes the case that if Euro area workers were 
to work the same hours as their American counterparts, their productivity per capita would be far superior 
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(Blanchard, The Economic Future of Europe, 2004).  It is questionable; however, whether the differential in hours 
worked was due to leisure or unemployment.   
 
Another important aspect when considering a currency’s strength is the sheer size of the underlying 
economy.  The Euro area’s gross domestic product is second only to the United States’.  The EA’s 2008 GDP was 
EUR 9.209 trillion, or USD 13.475 trillion when converted using the year’s average exchange rate of 1.4633 
USD/EUR.  This compares with the U.S.’ 2008 GDP of USD 14.441 trillion.  While it is true that more recent GDP 
comparisons will factor in a weakened euro, the Euro area productivity is closing in on the reigning GDP leader.  In 
fact, it seems only a matter of time before this actually occurs.  Nine more countries are expected to join the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).  Original plans were for all twenty-seven European Union countries to join 
the EMU; however, it seems that the United Kingdom has no intention of retiring the pound or joining the union.  
Nevertheless, had the remaining countries currently awaiting admittance to the union been included in 2008’s GDP 
calculations, the revised number would have been USD 15.650 trillion.  This would catapult the Euro area past the 
United States’ as the world’s largest economy. 
 
Overall, the economic growth and size aspects for the Euro area should be considered a strength going 
forward.  Despite Beiling’s accurate observations concerning the Euro area’s disappointing organic growth in GDP, 
the region should benefit from the efficiency improvements noted by Blanchard.  The Euro area GDP should also 
increase as a result of adding other European Union countries.   As a result, many economists project the EMU to be 
the world’s largest economy within the next ten years.  As a result, more transactions would be denominated in 
euros, the currency’s visibility in the marketplace would increase accordingly.  These factors would contribute to a 
strengthening euro. 
 
Although economic growth and size are one of the most influential factors, its counterpart, inflation, can 
prove vitally important to currency strength discussions.  The next section will introduce this topic and discuss the 




Another important metric to consider when projecting a currency’s strength relative to peers is inflation.  
Inflation has a proven impact on a currency’s exchange rate by virtue of the Fisher effect.  As such, any increase in 
expected inflation will cause a proportionate increase in domestic interest rates.  This rise in interest rates will 
increase the money supply, resulting in a depreciating exchange rate, ceteris paribus.  Investors generally seek asset 
investments in countries with low and predictable inflation rates.  Consequently, economies with lower inflation 
should experience greater foreign demand for their domestic currencies.   
 
One of the primary goals in establishing the Economic and Monetary Union was to control pricing 
instability within the European Union.  Accordingly, the European Central Bank’s primary monetary policy tenet is 
to maintain pricing stability as mandated by the Treaty Establishing the European Community.  The Governing 
Council has since defined this metric using the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the Euro area.  
The current goal is to maintain the HICP index at or below two percent per year for the entire region. 
 
On the surface, it seems that the ECB has effectively attained its goal.  Its HICP growth has been very 
comparable with American inflation as measured by the U.S. consumer price index over the past ten years.  
However, it should be noted that the definition of HICP is ambiguous and may not provide a valid comparison with 
United States’ published inflation figures.  The two measurements have stark conceptual differences.  One journal 
article claims that the HICP is not a cost of living index at all and raises serious questions regarding its accuracy.  
(Cecchetti, Wynne, Galí, & and Propper, 2003).  The authors, however, concluded that other reputable indexes are 
inaccurate at times due to inherent biases.  The main reason for their concern is the lack of guidance as to the 
necessary adjustments that are made, if any.  Furthermore, the HICP results are difficult to replicate.   
 
Another concern is the level of inflation divergence within the Euro area.  From 1999 through 2002, 
Ireland, Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain experienced the highest inflation rates, varying between 3.1% 
and 4.1% compared with the EMU average of 2.5% (Honohan, Lane, Ventura, & and Begg, 2003).  After 
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conducting similar statistical analyses on the United States and the EMU, the authors concluded that the inflation 
divergence within the U.S. was larger.  Although that may be the case for the study, it is still noteworthy nonetheless 
that the European Central Bank is ill-equipped to target specific regions.  The ECB’s tactics are limited to large-
scale interventions.   
 
The Euro area’s inflation potential should be considered a weakness at this point.  Despite having 
respectable comparisons with the United States, the future inflation expectations are difficult to project.  The lack of 
clarity on the ECB’s HICP calculations is concerning and additional modifications may be necessary to ensure 
improved accuracy in the future.  Various studies have shown that inflation levels using different metrics have 
improved throughout the Euro area since unionization. This is a good sign.  But the Euro area is still early in its 




An economy’s annual current account, also called the balance of payments, is another important metric for 
predicting a currency’s future potential.  The current account represents net payments and cash receipts from 
transactions with other countries.  It includes such categories as exports, imports, foreign investment income, and 
unilateral transfers (charity and aid) to other countries.  There are a myriad of macroeconomic factors that impact the 
current account.  Some examples include trade policies, interest rates, gross national product, investment 
opportunities, and foreign exchange rates.  It is important to keep these factors in mind when interpreting current 
account balances. 
 
Since its inception, the Economic Monetary Union has maintained a strong current account position.  The 
union has had account surpluses in five of the eleven years it has been in existence.  The deficits experienced seem 
immaterial when compared to the region’s overall GDP.  The deficit outliers were years 2000 and 2008, both global 
recessionary periods.  These incidents were most likely attributable to the relative weakness in the U.S. dollar that 
stifled demand for Euro area goods. 
 
By contrast, the U.S. has incurred increasing current account deficits each year.  Its account deficit has 
grown from $398 billion in 2001 to 706 billion in 2008 (Flatness, Whitake, & Yuskavage, 2009).  Ordinarily, these 
deficits would eventually lead to a weakened dollar, assuming other countries used the proceeds from these 
imbalances to invest in other economies’ financial markets.  This has not happened, however, since foreign countries 
have invested their surpluses in American governmental debt.  Another contributing factor is the high global demand 
for American investments (Exchange Rate Conundrums, 2003).  This has artificially strengthened the dollar and 
made American goods overpriced compared to foreign offerings, thus making them less competitive.  Overall, 
America’s excessive debt burden in addition to its rapidly increasing deficits is quite alarming. 
 
As such, the Euro area’s current account should be considered a strength when compared with that of the 
United States’.  Although the Euro area current account balance is still in negative territory at the present time due to 
the recession, it is expected to improve as the global recovery becomes more pronounced (Davis, 2010).  This 
assessment seems reasonable as it is consistent with prior period trends. 
 
Two primary tools employed by government officials to guide the economy are monetary and fiscal policy.  
Monetary policy was mentioned earlier in both the inflation and background sections.  The other tool, fiscal policy, 




Fiscal policy refers to governmental revenue and spending policies used to influence economic activity.  
Governmental spending can encourage entrepreneurial development and industrial diversification.  It can also soften 
the shocks of economic hardships, originating both internally and externally.  The buffering effects, therefore, can 
improve an economy’s potential to support a strong currency.  There are limitations however.  Countries that spend 
beyond their revenue, or tax receipts, will effectively dilute their currencies.  To complicate matters further, unlike 
the independent central bankers, fiscal policy is subject to political whims arising from constituent and exogenous 
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pressures.  It is obviously a daunting task to maintain an effective fiscal policy.  But, if achieved, the benefits to 
currency strength are numerous. 
 
The European Economic and Monetary Union’s biggest challenge is the absence of a coordinated fiscal 
policy.  Unlike the United States where fiscal policy is determined centrally, the EMU is organized such that each of 
the seventeen member nations establishes its own governmental revenue and expenditure directives.  However, these 
initiatives are substantially limited by the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact.  These provisions 
limit spending in excess of three percent of annual GDP.  Additionally, these rules restrict a nation’s total debt to 
sixty percent of GDP.  If either of these stipulations are violated, the country will face “excessive deficit 
procedures”, which generally involve greater restrictions and, in some cases, punitive actions.  There are allowances 
for recessionary periods or other major catastrophes. 
 
The Maastricht Treaty and the Growth and Stability Pact have been controversial.  Respected Greek 
professor Theodore Pelagidis and Lloyd’s of London senior analyst Evangelia Desli contend that these policies 
provide barriers to growth that will ultimately undermine the euro’s credibility (Pelagidis & Desli, 2004).  Others are 
concerned that the Stability and Growth Pact limits countries’ ability to offer governmental services and build public 
infrastructure.  However, authors Galí, Perrotti, Lane, and Richter conducted empirical studies and concluded that 
none of these claims held true (Galí, Perotti, Lane, & Richter, 2003).  Geoffrey Garret of Yale University is even 
more optimistic since he believes that the stability pact rules will not be enforced and will be administered with a 
great deal of flexibility (Garrett, 2000).  Geoffrey’s assessment seems valid but raises another concern.  If the rules 
were disregarded, this could undermine European Central Bank policies, thus making their objectives much more 
difficult to accomplish.  
 
The Euro area’s fiscal policies are much weaker than those of the United States’ as they are more difficult 
to implement and are subject to stiff limitations.  Although the Maastricht Treaty and Growth and Stability Pact seek 
to limit irresponsible and excessive spending, their effectiveness and enforcement measures are questionable.  Given 
that fiscal policy is really the sole economic tool available to Euro area’s governmental heads, this is significant 
blow to currency strength arguments.   
 
The previous discussions were dedicated to evaluating a currency’s home economy performance as it 
relates to currency strength.  The following sections will discuss the currency’s role in international trades and relate 




Currency usage is generally measured by the percentage of global trade transactions invoiced in a particular 
currency even if the currency’s home country is uninvolved.  Several factors are considered when selecting the best 
currency to use in global transactions.  Chief among them are availability, volatility, and pricing stability.  
Regardless of the rationale, however, the currency of choice will gradually strengthen in relation to its peers.  
Accordingly, a transactional usage discussion is warranted whenever contemplating the future of a currency. 
 
The euro’s usage and visibility have increased substantially since its 1999 introduction.  In five short years, 
the euro’s involvement in global transactions outside the EMU increased from 20.8 percent to 27.7 percent (Kamps, 
2006).  Despite this positive development, the currency was by far overshadowed by the U.S. dollar in 2004.  During 
this period, the dollar was involved in at least one side of a global transaction 88.7 percent of the time.  By contrast, 
the euro was involved in only 37.2 percent of all transactions (Goldberg, Engel, & Portes, 2005).    
 
The euro’s prospects are brightening, however.  Annette Kamps concluded that the euro’s role in currency 
transactions has been ever increasing as more countries are admitted into the Economic and Monetary Union 
(Kamps, 2006).  Many others have shared this view since the euro’s debut in 1999.  Although at that time, many 
believed the United Kingdom would not hesitate in joining the union.  Despite their reluctance, there is still 
considerable room for growth in EMU membership.  Therefore, it is reasonable to expect the euro to gain traction 
within the upcoming decade with nine potential additions to the EMU on the horizon.   
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As a result of additional accessions to the union and favorable trade invoicing trends, the euro seems 
destined to become more involved in global transactions.  Although the currency is still lagging the dollar in global 
involvement, the euro’s expected increase in usage is viewed as a strength.  Consequently, this factor should favor a 
strengthening euro for some time to come. 
 
The importance of the involvement in global trade cannot be over-emphasized.  In fact, some believe that 
this type of exposure is a primary determinant in a central bank’s decision to denominate reserves in a particular 
currency, which is the focus of the next section (Portes, Rey, De Grauwe, & Honkapohja, 1998).     
 
FOREIGN CURRENCY RESERVES 
 
Foreign currency reserves refer to other central banks’ holdings in a particular currency and directly impact 
a currency’s demand.  A currency’s foreign reserve weighting and its relative exchange rate strength are interrelated.  
Generally, as foreign banks accumulate larger quantities of a currency, the resulting global demand increases, 
resulting in a strengthening versus peers, all else held constant.  The reverse can be true as well.  If central banks 
perceive a long-term appreciation pattern, they are more apt to accumulate and hold those currencies in their 
reserves.  Either way, foreign currency reserve weightings are important to a currency’s future strength.  Thus, a 
thorough evaluation of reserve trends could reveal some indication as to the direction of a currency’s exchange rate. 
 
The Euro has increased its weight in known global foreign reserves from 18.2 percent in 1999 to 
approximately 27.4 percent in 2009 (Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves, 2010).  These 
figures are limited in that they are based on only fifty-six (2009) to seventy-seven (1999) percent of the global 
foreign currency reserves.  In addition, a significant portion of the euro’s increase is attributable to a sharp 
appreciation in its exchange rate from 2000 to 2002 (Force, 2006).   
 
The euro has gained ground and seemingly at the dollar’s expense.  Although the dollar remains the 
preeminent foreign reserve currency, its weighting has decreased from 71.0 percent to 62.1 percent of known global 
reserves over the past ten years (Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves, 2010).  The dollar’s 
decline is most likely attributable to the euro’s surge in exchange rates referenced earlier.  Nevertheless, as 
mentioned above, appreciation trends can lead central bankers to pursue higher reserve levels of a particular 
currency over time. 
 
The euro’s foreign reserve trend appears promising and should be viewed as an overall strength.  Although 
much of the previous increase has been related to foreign exchange movements, the currency’s fundamentals have 
been improving.  Measures of these fundamentals include economic size, financial market development, historical 
stability, and global market confidence in the currency’s value (Frankel, 1995).  As indicated in earlier discussions, 
the euro and the underlying Euro area economy have shown a great deal of improvement in these areas, especially 
when contemplating the prospects of additional accessions to the monetary union. 
 
This section concludes the review of the factors contributing to a currency’s strength relative to its peers.  
The following discussion will collectively evaluate these factors to form an opinion about the Euro’s ten-year 
trajectory. 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EURO 
 
The euro has several strengths supporting a stronger exchange rate in coming years.  Although the Euro 
area currently underperforms the American economy in terms of GDP growth, the region’s trends point towards a 
promising future.  Growth is supported by improved GDP per capita performance and potential accessions to the 
Economic and Monetary Union.  The Euro area’s current account is by far superior to that of the United States.  It 
has historically been a net exporter and has experienced significant account surpluses.  Despite recent deficits due to 
the global recession, statistical analyses indicate substantial improvement.  Other strengths favoring a strengthening 
euro include increased international usage and higher foreign currency reserve weightings.  These are expected to 
increase given the positive exchange rate developments and future EMU accessions. 
 
International Business & Economics Research Journal – July 2011 Volume 10, Number 7 
28 © 2011 The Clute Institute 
While these developments are promising, the currency has at least one significant obstacle to overcome.  
The most glaring issue is the Euro area’s fiscal policies.  The inability to coordinate a standard policy could limit the 
region’s ability to grow.   Furthermore, the budgetary and debt constraints could prove debilitating to individual 
nations.  Although empirical research suggests this would not be the case, the region has not undergone significant 
trials to determine the reality.  Another concern is the European Central Banks’ use of the “Harmonised Index of 
Consumer Prices” (HICP) to gauge inflation.  While the ECB seems to be meeting its targets, many question its 
accuracy.  Even if the banker’s inflation management is satisfactory, it is vitally important that the ECB base its 
monetary policies on correct information.   
 
The Euro area’s strengths favor a larger economy, one that may challenge the United States’ for 
supremacy.  Furthermore, the currency’s usage and reserve trends support substantial increases in demand.  The 
weaknesses, while concerning, are not as tangible as the strengths. Based on these analyses, it is reasonable to 
project a strengthening euro over the next ten years.   
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of this paper was to evaluate the Euro area and the euro using a list of factors to determine the 
currency’s ten year trajectory.  Various journal articles were used to compare a variety of views regarding the euro 
and its underlying economy.  The criteria on which to make these assessments included economic growth, inflation, 
fiscal policy, international usage and global foreign currency reserve weightings.   
 
After reviewing the voluminous literature available, the findings indicated that the Euro area has made 
significant progress in only ten short years.  The currency’s demand has been increasing and the underlying 
economy seems poised for additional growth.  These and other factors supported this paper’s prediction that the euro 
will strengthen in relation to its peers within the next decade. 
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